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69 
How To Talk About the Constitution 
Sara Aronchick Solow* & Barry Friedman** 
INTRODUCTION 
Since at least the early 1980s, the legal academy has been preoccupied 
with the question of constitutional interpretation. Not, mind you, the 
question of what the Constitution actually means. Rather, scholars have 
been consumed with the question of how the Constitution should be 
interpreted—what methodology should govern constitutional 
interpretation. In short, we have talked and talked about how to talk about 
the Constitution, rather than just talking about it. 
The publication of Jack Balkin‟s Living Originalism provides just the 
occasion to suggest it is time for academics to abandon their incestuous 
and exhausted conversations about interpretive methodology and focus 
instead on what the Constitution actually means. Balkin‟s rich book makes 
strong statements about interpretive methodology and provides incisive 
readings of particular constitutional provisions. Of the two, by far the most 
successful is the latter. This is not to say we necessarily agree with 
Balkin‟s particular interpretations, a question we sidestep here. It is rather 
to say Balkin‟s substantive commitments are interesting and worth 
fighting about, while his discussion of interpretive methodology is 
unlikely to take us any place we have not been before. 
In this piece, we urge a turn away from the longstanding debates over 
interpretive methodology and toward more actual interpretation. Despite 
such debates, judges and lawyers find commonality every day in how they 
interpret the Constitution in the cases they hear and resolve. Here, we 
advocate adopting this common and familiar method, what one might call 
“ordinary constitutional interpretation,” and show how in doing so one can 
come to important and perhaps surprising conclusions about what is part 
of our Constitution (and what is not). 
Part I describes the interpretive debates that have preoccupied us since 
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the 1970s, and Part II explains that those extensive debates have not taken 
us very far. Part III then suggests the alternative: we should all adopt the 
method of “ordinary constitutional interpretation” that takes place daily in 
the courtrooms and judicial chambers of America. Part IV provides some 
payoff; it shows how, by interpreting in this ordinary way, one can see a 
right to a minimally adequate education that previously has not been 
thought to exist in the Constitution. Part V concludes by suggesting other 
rights that seem more tangible than previously believed if one engages in 
this ordinary interpretive technique. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERPRETIVE DEBATES 
Why the legal academy fell down the rabbit hole of interpretive 
methodology is hardly a secret. It was driven by ideology and 
constitutional politics. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, conservatives 
looked for an interpretive methodology to roll back liberal constitutional 
decisions of the Warren Court.1 They settled on originalism.2 Liberals 
responded with their own counter-theory—“living constitutionalism”—to 
defend the precedents of the past twenty years and explain why the 
Warren Court was not only making the country a better place through its 
decisions but also faithfully interpreting the Constitution all the while. 
Each theory, however, developed deep internal shortcomings. Take 
originalism. After many permutations, some documented by Balkin, 
originalism has abandoned a search for what real people thought about 
real problems, instead seeking to understand what people long dead would 
have thought about then-hypothetical or distant problems.3 More 
 
1. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 306-13 (2009) 
(describing the emergence of originalism as a strategic response by conservatives to certain Warren 
Court and early Burger Court decisions); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice: The Right‟s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 547 (2006) (“Critics of the 
Warren Court began to argue that determining the original understanding of the Constitution‟s framers 
was the only legitimate way of interpreting the Constitution.”). 
2. See JOHNATHAN O‟NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 9 (2005) (“[T]he originalist idea stood as a fundamental and newly 
enlivened alternative to the reformist use and scholarly, legal liberal encouragement of modern judicial 
power.”); Dawn Johnsen, Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the Twenty-first 
Century, 1 HARV. L. & POL‟Y REV. 239, 244 (2007) (presenting the Reagan Administration‟s policy 
goals “within the framework of [a new call for] originalism—the drive to limit constitutional meaning 
to the specific meaning the Framers had in mind at the time of drafting and ratification”); OFFICE OF 
LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ORIGINAL MEANING 
JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 1-2 (1987) (characterizing originalism as the only legitimate method 
of interpretation and “the only approach that takes seriously the status of our Constitution as 
fundamental law, and that permits our society to remain self-governing”). 
3. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution‟s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1129 n.52 (2003) (“[W]hat the Framers or Ratifiers intended, 
expected . . . [is less relevant to determining the meaning of constitutional text]. What is relevant is the 
hypothetical, objective original public meaning of the Constitution‟s words and phrases themselves on 
this subject.”); see also Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 245 
(2009) (describing the jurisprudential shift in focus from original intention, to original meaning, to 
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problematically, originalism has survived only by making a series of 
accommodations that profoundly undermine its integrity.4 Originalists 
have shown a marked willingness to depart from the conclusions their 
methodology would dictate when political palatability so required. “In its 
undiluted form, at least,” wrote Justice Scalia, one of the patron saints of 
originalism, it “is medicine that seems too strong to swallow.”5 Thus, like 
many originalists, he accepted stare decisis even when originalism would 
compel overturning key cases.6 And—also like many others—he conceded 
that he was a “faint-hearted originalist” unwilling or uncaring to challenge 
many aspects of today‟s constitutionalism that would not have made any 
sense to the founding generation.7 As Jack Balkin‟s laundry list of things 
originalists are faint-hearted about makes clear, when one is done making 
exceptions, the rule itself looks a bit hollow.8 To name but a few notable 
exceptions: the modern structure of the presidency, the legitimacy of the 
administrative state, a great shift in power from state governments to the 
center, and equality for all citizens, especially women, African-Americans, 
and gays.9 Subtract all this and one wonders what originalism is meant to 
accomplish exactly. 
Meanwhile, on the Left, living constitutionalism has suffered its own 
intellectual and rhetorical collapse.10 Justice Scalia is unyielding in 
 
objective textual meaning, to the original understanding of a hypothetical reasonable member of the 
community). 
4. Most originalists concede that some nonoriginalist constitutional doctrines should be retained. 
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of 
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1808-10 (1997) (conceding that on issues like gender equality, 
“the reasoning of the Framers—viewed in modern perspective—will be so flawed or distasteful as to 
suggest that the Constitution means the opposite of what they assumed”); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‟S 
EMPIRE 362-63 (1986) (justifying desegregation decisions by arguing that judges must determine 
whether “the framers‟ concrete opinion about segregation is consistent with their more abstract 
convictions about equality”); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 95-96 (1991) 
(quoting statements made by Judge Robert Bork during the 1987 Senate Hearings on his nomination to 
the Supreme Court, including statements that the nation‟s growth and development preclude altering 
some Commerce Clause jurisprudence that violates the intentions of the Constitution‟s drafters). 
5. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989). 
6. Id. (“[A]lmost every originalist would adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare 
decisis”); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 140 
(1997) (“As I have explained, stare decisis is not part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic 
exception to it.”). 
7. Scalia, supra note 5, at 864 (“I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted 
originalist.”). 
8. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 108 (2011). 
9. See Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Constitution, 
SLATE (Aug. 29, 2005, 5:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence 
/2005/08/alive_and_kicking.html (“A host of federal laws securing the environment, protecting 
workers and consumers—even central aspects of Social Security—go beyond the original 
understanding of federal power, not to mention most federal civil rights laws that protect women, 
racial and religious minorities, and the disabled from private discrimination . . . . [U]nder the original 
understanding of the Constitution . . . Presidential authority would be vastly curtailed [and independent 
federal agencies like the Federal Reserve Board and the FCC would all be unconstitutional].”). 
10. Since its inception, the originalist movement has attacked the legitimacy and coherence of 
living constitutionalism. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. 
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explaining why originalism is the more legitimate methodology: “If you 
somehow adopt a philosophy that the Constitution itself is not static, but 
rather it morphs from age to age to say whatever it ought to say—which is 
probably whatever the people would want it to say—you eliminate the 
whole purpose of a Constitution. And that is essentially what the so-called 
living Constitution leaves you with.”11 Scalia‟s criticism stings sufficiently 
that the Left has scrambled to come up with a response. It has been unable 
to offer a theory—or even a rhetorical device—that solves the twin 
problems of legitimacy and accounting for change over time.12 In 2006 
James Ryan concluded that Cass Sunstein‟s “book[] fall[s] a bit flat, at 
least in the eyes of this (sympathetic) reader,” because Sunstein neither 
offered nor justified a theory of constitutional interpretation.13 The volume 
The Constitution in 2020 was one critical effort.14 Although full of liberal 
ideals, nothing in it has yet caught on as the Left‟s response to how the 
Constitution itself should be interpreted. Then, in the Summer 2011 issue 
of Democracy, the editors hosted a forum resting on the proposition that 
“[f]or too long progressives have wrestled with the question only to come 
short of the answer. They have complained about the Right‟s step-by-step 
co-opting of the conversation about the Constitution, but they have not 
countered with their own narrative.”15 
And as the Left scraps around for an interpretive theory, it is being 
driven back—ironically—to text and intent. In their entry to the 
Democracy forum, Doug Kendall and Jim Ryan advocate for “New 
Textualism,” a mixture of text and intent reminiscent of some of the work 
of Akhil Amar.16 Jack Balkin‟s book Living Originalism also makes a 
 
L. REV. 693, 695-706 (1975) (describing living constitutionalism as the proposition that “nonelected 
members of the federal judiciary may address themselves to a social problem simply because other 
branches of government have failed or refused to do so,” and criticizing the theory as undemocratic 
and ignorant of its own “disastrous” history, including Dred Scott and Lochner); James E. Ryan, Does 
It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1631 (2006) 
(reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2005) and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)) (arguing that early criticisms remain valid because “all [nonoriginalist 
approaches] suffer from a similar inability to answer the following question: If the original meaning of 
the Constitution is not to be the guide, what is?”). 
11. Ari Shapiro, All Things Considered: Conservatives Have „Originalism‟; Liberals Have . . . ?, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 23, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=105439966 (quoting Justice Scalia). 
12. See Dahlia Lithwick, Reasons To Go on Living: Does Anyone Believe in a “Living 
Constitution” Anymore?, SLATE (Aug. 23 2005, 5:01 PM) (“Many prominent liberal thinkers have 
retreated from William Brennan‟s soaring language about the need for a „living Constitution,‟ because, 
I think, it embarrasses them. The idea [that it is arrogant to gauge the Framers‟ intent with respect to 
contemporary issues] has been rebutted roundly with the notion that it‟s even more arrogant for nine 
unelected officials to gauge anything at all.”). 
13. Ryan, supra note 10, at 1627. 
14. THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
15. First Principles: Debating the Constitution, 21 DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS 59, 60 (Summer 2011). 
16. Doug Kendall & Jim Ryan, The Case for New Textualism, 21 DEMOCRACY 66 (2011). For 
examples of Akhil Amar‟s text-based but progressive method of constitutional interpretation, see, for 
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powerful case for a left-based interpretive theory that has founding era 
roots.17 
In a sense, we now see some convergence between the Left‟s and the 
Right‟s versions of constitutional interpretive theory, albeit one obscured 
by their rhetoric (and differing outcomes, of course).18 The Right stands 
staunch for original understandings, while basically ceding any turf as fait 
accompli that simply cannot win public acceptance. Which turns out to be 
much of the constitutional world that we inhabit today. And the Left, long 
the home of living constitutionalism, looks to plant deeper roots. 
II. WHAT‟S WRONG WITH INTERPRETIVE DEBATES 
Enter Balkin. 
In Living Originalism, Jack Balkin offers up a book-length discussion of 
interpretive methodology, peppered with substantive discussions of the 
Constitution. We agree with many things Balkin has to say. But the book 
runs up against some serious problems as well, and it is from those that we 
launch our critique of interpretive debates. 
Balkin, the Book, has many wonderful qualities, some of which mirror 
those of Balkin, the Person. Jack Balkin is a person of provocative ideas, 
but also of great generosity. Living Originalism shares this; the text offers 
much to think about and consider, and both text and footnotes attest to 
Balkin‟s generous participation in the mutual academic endeavor. Balkin 
is a fierce partisan, who nonetheless will happily step across the aisle 
seeking concord. Living Originalism does the same: it is, like Balkin, an 
essentially progressive project, but one that seeks union with conservatives 
on certain premises of sensible interpretation. Balkin is an expert in 
bricolage, the fashioning together of workable and elegant solutions from 
the tools at hand; Living Originalism is a pastiche of prominent 
interpretive theories, fashioned into one comprehensive and coherent 
whole. 
As we make even clearer in another article, published roughly 
contemporaneously with this piece, we agree with a great deal of what 
 
example, Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788-96 (1999) (advocating 
“intratextualism”—interpreting contested Constitutional text with reference to identical or similar 
phrases elsewhere in the Constitution—as an alternative to “clause-bound textualism”); Akhil Reed 
Amar, America‟s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1734 (2011) (arguing that the written 
Constitution signals the existence of unenumerated rights and “faithful constitutional interpreters” 
appropriately look to expectations and practices of the American public to identify basic constitutional 
rights “not expressly listed in the terse text”). 
17. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 101. 
18. See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1524 (2011) (“Living constitutionalism is largely dead. So, too, is old-style 
originalism. Instead, there is increasing convergence in the legal academy around what might be called 
„new textualism.‟”). 
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Balkin has to say.19 We agree that constitutional interpretation cannot 
begin without attention to the document‟s text and the intentions, 
understandings, and meanings of those who authored it. We also join 
Balkin in believing interpretation cannot end there, especially with a 
constitution that is over two hundred years old. History provides important 
insight into constitutional meaning. We could not agree with Balkin more 
when he says: “A method of constitutional interpretation is not a decision 
procedure. It is more like a common language that allows people with very 
different views to reason together.”20 
So, what possibly could be the problem? We see two, neither of which 
are peculiar to Balkin, but are characteristic of many of the academy‟s 
interpretive projects over the past twenty years. First, Balkin‟s book fails 
to offer a digestible organizing principle or message to those members of 
the public who might seek to use it as a platform for constitutional 
dialogue. Theories of constitutional interpretation should be accessible to 
the public for the very reason that, as Balkin argues, constitutional 
meanings are forged through public action. The problem is that Balkin‟s 
book is so loaded with jargon, it is unlikely to provide any members of the 
public—including progressives, Balkin‟s intended audience—a slogan for 
recapturing the constitutional high ground. For example, Balkin speaks of 
“framework originalism” and “skyscraper originalism.” The former is 
good because it means that the authors of the Constitution created a 
framework for government but left it to their posterity to deliver on the 
Constitution‟s promise, while the latter is bad because it would freeze 
meaning as original expected application. But the terms don‟t resonate. 
Why are skyscrapers bad? They seem so very modern and necessary. 
(Suburban sprawl, now that is a problem!) There‟s constitutional 
“construction,” a term the academy seems to have adopted because 
“interpretation” became a dirty word.21 There‟s “interpretation-as-
ascertainment” and “interpretation-as-construction.”22 There are the (at 
least) five different meanings of “original meaning.”23 There‟s 
“redemptive constitutionalism.”24 There‟s just a lot to keep in one‟s head. 
To be clear, we‟re not just picking on Balkin here. Much of the legal 
academy is guilty as charged. Including, for good measure, at least one of 
us.25 This rabbit hole is deep and wide—and littered with some of the best 
 
19. Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 92 (2013). 
20. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 136-37; accord. id. at 257 (“Framework originalism is not an 
algorithm for correct decision. It is a platform for ordinary legal argument about the Constitution.”). 
21. See id. at 4. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 12. 
24. Id. at 73. 
25. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(1998). 
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work constitutional scholars have to offer. And that‟s the shame of it. 
The second problem with Living Originalism is that Balkin‟s proposed 
theory, like so many of the others that have emerged from the academy in 
the past several decades, collapses on itself in an effort to accommodate 
everyone. In what can only be deemed an extended exercise in “if you 
can‟t beat ‟em, join ‟em,” Balkin‟s book adopts originalism as a 
methodology even as it trashes it. We agree with Balkin about the many 
shortcomings of originalism (just as we agree about the many 
shortcomings of “living constitutionalism”). But, even if we acknowledge 
that any serious constitutional interpretive methodology must take account 
of text and original meaning, understanding, or intention, was it really 
necessary for Balkin to adopt the very stance of the methodology he was 
rejecting? Many have been perplexed by Balkin‟s intentions in doing so. 
But as if to put a point on it, in his chapters putting “living originalism” to 
work for actual constitutional provisions, he frequently slips away from 
his own unique version of originalism and into what reads as pure 
originalist reasoning—a fixation on original expected application. 
The best defense in response to our complaints might be necessity—
namely, that there‟s no other way to read the Constitution. That is, the 
professoriate‟s jargon-laden approach is the only way to get from 1787 to 
today. But that defense does not hold water because in truth there is an 
alternative. Balkin aptly reminds us that interpretation is a practice, not a 
prescription. In the world of real legal practice there is an alternative to all 
this theoretical debate, which has not really gotten us anywhere. It is to 
that world that we turn. 
III. HOW TO TALK ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION 
Law professors talk about how to talk about the Constitution. Lawyers 
and judges talk about the Constitution. Law professors are mired in 
interpretive debates. Lawyers and judges just interpret. And how those 
lawyers and judges interpret is telling, especially in its contrast with 
academic debates. 
Begin with the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which holds 
that the Constitution‟s Second Amendment protects the right to own a gun 
for personal protection.26 The case is telling because it is written by a 
judge and scholar who is one of the founding fathers of originalism, 
Justice Scalia. But there is a difference between Scalia as a conservative 
theoretician and Scalia as a Justice writing for the Court. 
Although Heller looks in some ways to be an originalist decision, it is—
as Balkin himself has observed—anything but. Yes, the opinion leans 
 
26. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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heavily on text and original meanings.27 But those things cannot get the 
Court where it was headed, a point made poignantly clear in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago.28 There the Court confronted the next question: whether 
the Second Amendment bound the states. Justice Alito‟s opinion for the 
Court relied on an altogether different original meaning—that of 
Reconstruction, not the Founding—to support the extension of the Second 
Amendment right to the states.29 Justice Scalia‟s own opinion, however, 
makes the point well enough, for ultimately he deals not only with text and 
original meaning, but with pre- and post-ratification practice, precedent, 
evolved understandings, normative justification, and consequentialist 
limitations on the right. It is by surveying this broad array of sources that 
Justice Scalia locates the ethos of self-defense purportedly at the center of 
the Second Amendment.30 
Indeed, Heller looks just like constitutional interpretation as it gets 
taught in law school. Two excellent works of scholarship, somewhat 
outside the norm when it comes to interpretive methodology, remind us 
how constitutional interpreters usually interpret. Those works are Phillip 
Bobbitt‟s twin volumes Constitutional Fate and Constitutional 
Interpretation, and Richard Fallon‟s A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation.31 Both authors seek to identify the 
“modalities” or types of arguments that are familiar among real-world 
constitutional interpreters, both within and outside the judiciary. Bobbit, 
for his part, identifies six “modalities” of constitutional argument that he 
contends animate and legitimate the practice of judicial review: historical, 
textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential argument.32 Fallon, in 
a similar vein, finds that “most judges, lawyers, and commentators 
recognize the relevance of at least five kinds of constitutional argument”: 
text, intentions of framers, purposes of a clause or the whole document, 
 
27. Id. at 581-603; see also Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 
(2008) (reporting that Heller has been accurately described as “the most originalist opinion in 
Supreme Court history”). 
28. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
29. Id. at 3038 (“By the 1850‟s, the perceived threat that had prompted the inclusion of the 
Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights—the fear that the National Government would disarm the 
universal militia—had largely faded as a popular concern, but the right to keep and bear arms was 
highly valued for purposes of self-defense.”). 
30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 605-19 (offering a historical exegesis); id. at 619-26 (offering an analysis 
of Miller); id. at 629-36 (comparing the D.C. handgun ban to other historical gun regulations and 
concluding that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of 
the District‟s handgun ban” because “they do not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as 
an absolute ban on handguns”). 
31.  See BOBBITT, supra note 4, at 95-96; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 234 (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987). 
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535 
(1999) (reviewing a variety of constitutional theories that have been developed by judges and scholars 
and proposing substantive criteria that should be used to evaluate these theories). 
32. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 31, at 1-119. 
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precedent, and “value arguments that assert claims about justice or social 
policy.”33 These modalities that Bobbit and Fallon are describing are 
precisely the forms of argument deployed by Justice Scalia in the Heller 
decision. 
There is nothing novel about this sort of interpretation, and nothing 
ideologically driven. It was in use as early as Chief Justice Marshall‟s 
universally-acclaimed opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.34 This form of 
interpretation justified the “conservative” result in Heller, but also the 
“liberal” results in Boumediene v. Bush35 and Lawrence v. Texas.36 In 
Glucksberg v. Washington, the conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist used 
this sort of interpretive methodology, but so did his more moderate and 
liberal colleagues, Justices O‟Connor, Breyer, and Stevens.37 In Roper v. 
Simmons38 and Graham v. Florida,39 the Court used holistic constitutional 
interpretation to construe the meaning of the Eighth Amendment‟s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment as applied to juveniles. In Roper, the Court 
spelled out a two-part methodology for assessing Eighth Amendment 
claims: first, the Court would consider “objective indicia of society‟s 
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice”; 
second, it would draw on its “own understanding and interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment‟s text, history, meaning, and purpose.”40 In Graham, 
the Court clarified that “objective indicia of society‟s standards” include 
 
33. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory, supra note 31, at 1189. 
34. 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (holding the Commerce Clause grants the federal government power to 
regulate navigation that is “connected with „commerce . . . among the Several states‟”). 
35. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
36. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that the writ of habeas corpus 
extended to foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay and the Department of Defense‟s Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals did not provide an effective and adequate substitute. It came to this holding through 
a full deployment of the Bobbitt modalities—beginning with an “account of the history and origins of 
the writ” in England in the 1600s, and including an analysis of precedent, separation of powers 
principles, legislative enactments concerning habeas corpus throughout U.S. history, and “practical 
concerns” about what it would mean, geopolitically, to enable the writ to reach Guantanamo. 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740-52. In Lawrence, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected the right to consensual, homosexual relations through another 
extensive examination of United States social history—from the founding through the modern day—
and a discussion of contemporary mores. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-71. 
37. Compare Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702, 710-16 (1997) (noting that “[w]e begin, 
as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation‟s history, legal traditions, and practices” 
and subsequently examining the “States‟ assisted-suicide bans” from recent years to bolster the 
holding), with id. at 736-37 (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing as a reason for her concurrence 
that there are at present “no [state] legal barriers” to effective medical alleviation of suffering for 
terminally ill patients and so Washington‟s ban on assisted suicide did not undermine a constitutional 
right), id. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice O‟Connor that the challenged laws 
should be upheld because they do not prevent terminally ill patients from receiving treatment that 
controls severe pain), and id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring) (writing separately to “make it clear that 
there is also room for further debate about the limits that the Constitution places on the power of the 
States to punish the practice [of physician-assisted suicide]”). 
38. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
39. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
40. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 
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not just legislative enactments but social practices as well—for instance, 
even though 38 states permitted sentences of life without parole for 
juvenile, nonhomicide offenders, the fact that “26 States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Federal Government do not impose them despite 
apparent statutory authorization” evidenced an emerging national 
consensus against the practice.41 
The foregoing cases cover a wide swath, but that‟s the point: they are 
merely exemplars of a broad phenomenon. Numerous other cases could 
have been used to make the same point. While there is remarkably little 
that has been written on the actual interpretive methodologies of judges in 
constitutional cases,42 or other interpreters in extra-judicial forums such as 
Congress,43 what there is supports our assertion. Real judges aren‟t 
originalists or living constitutionalists, or any other “ists” either. 
So, that‟s what we recommend—that scholars abandon the now-
exhausted and exhausting debates over interpretive methodology and just 
start interpreting. The way judges do. We have wasted too much time, 
become too enamored of hearing ourselves talking about talking about the 
Constitution. And it has gotten us almost nowhere. Yet, in the real world, 
there is a way of interpreting the Constitution, a way very familiar to 
lawyers, that uses a well-known range of sources. Relying on all those 
sources, some the favorites of originalists, and some of living 
constitutionalists, we should get back to simply talking about the 
substance of the Constitution. 
Maybe talking about the Constitution seems quotidian or less sexy than 
fashioning novel theories littered with jargon. But to us that seems 
backward. Ordinary interpretation matters to the actual nature of the 
Republic we constantly are fashioning. And besides, as we are about to 
demonstrate, ordinary interpretation can yield some pretty interesting 
results. 
IV. THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO A MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION 
This is a summary of an argument made at greater length elsewhere.44 It 
shows how, if one talks about the Constitution as judges and practicing 
 
41. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024. 
42. See BOBBITT, supra note 4, at 45 (contending that “we should change our focus from attempts 
to explain why men and women think and argue as they do in constitutional law, to a description of 
how they have thought and argued”); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 257, 257 (2005) (“In the legal academy, scholarship about judicial review is predominantly 
normative. It is largely about how judges should decide cases and what posture they ought to take 
toward the work of other institutions.”). 
43. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Decision-Making Outside the Courts, 19 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2003) (“Legal scholars are regrettably preoccupied with the work of the 
federal courts . . . . [N]o systematic analysis of the quality and significance of [constitutional reasoning 
by political actors] . . . has yet been undertaken.”). 
44. See supra note 19. 
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lawyers do, it is possible to understand the Constitution as supporting 
rights that are not generally understood to exist there. One of the strongest 
of these rights is a federal right to a minimally adequate education. That 
right is grounded in the Due Process Clauses. Claiming that this right is 
“federal” does not necessarily mean the federal government has control 
over education, although the interpretive methodology does indicate that 
there has been an evolving federal role. Rather, the claim is that the states 
and local governments violate constitutional rights when they fail to 
provide a minimally adequate education. 
A. Text 
Begin with the Constitution‟s text, as good interpreters should, and 
almost always do.45 That text says nothing about a federal right to 
education. (Still, as others have argued, there are rights and 
responsibilities in the text, like speech or political participation, that do 
depend on and perhaps infer an education adequate to act as a responsible 
citizen).46 But the absence of a clear textual basis is hardly determinative, 
as countless cases show. Indeed, in the seminal federal education 
precedent, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Justice 
Marshall had this to say: 
I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to 
procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), or the 
right to vote in state elections, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964), or the right to an appeal from a criminal conviction, 
e.g., Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U.S. 12 (1956). These are instances in 
which, due to the importance of the interests at stake, the Court has 
displayed a strong concern with the existence of discriminatory 
state treatment. But the Court has never said or indicated that these 
are interests which independently enjoy full-blown constitutional 
protection.47 
Since the time of that statement, the central precedents finding broad 
acceptance but lacking a clear textual basis for their constitutional rights 
analyses have only multiplied, among them Lawrence v. Texas,48 Gideon 
v. Wainwright,49 and Griswold v. Connecticut.50 Even District of Columbia 
 
45. As Eskridge and Frickey point out in the context of statutory interpretation, using the model 
of a “funnel of abstraction,” judges first turn to text—the most concrete inquiry—when trying to 
decipher meaning from statutes. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation 
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990); see also supra notes 27, 31-33 and 
accompanying text (explaining that ordinary constitutional interpretation begins with the 
Constitution‟s text but also involves a comprehensive assessment of other sources). 
46. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330 
(2006) (arguing that a right to education is immanent in the union of the Fourteenth Amendment‟s 
Citizenship and Enforcement Clauses). 
47. United States v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 100 (1973). 
48. 39 U.S. 558 (2003). 
49. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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v. Heller,51 finding a right to possess a weapon for self-defense, required 
substantial reading around a text long believed plain in a manner opposite 
to its outcome. 
B. Framing Intentions 
Framing-era intentions and understandings are another place interpreters 
typically turn. Here, they provide more support for the claim that the 
federal constitution recognizes a right to education, although the evidence 
is decidedly mixed. 
On the one hand, public schooling, at least at the town level, was 
available at the time of the Framing and there were signs both of its 
important place in public discourse and even of its status as a 
constitutional right.52 Six of the original thirteen states had Education 
Clauses in their constitutions.53 Four of those included an obligation to 
establish schools, such as the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: “A 
school or schools shall be established in each county by the legislature, for 
the convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to the masters paid 
by the public, as may enable them to instruct youth at low prices.”54 
Central political figures and thought leaders such as Noah Webster, 
Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and John Adams argued that 
government had a duty to make education widely available.55 
Perhaps most important, two Land Ordinances of the Continental 
Congress planted deep roots for the contemporary American system of 
education—in which government is responsible for providing public 
education for its citizens. The Land Ordinance of 1785, dividing the 
 
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1963). 
51. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
52. For detailed accounts of the state of public schooling at the founding, see CARL F. KAESTLE, 
PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: 1780-1860, at 13-20 (1983); and EDWARD H. REISNER, THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 278-79 (1930). 
53. See MASS. CONST. of 1790, ch. 5, § 2; N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 83; VT. CONST. of 1777, § 
XL; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LIV; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 44; N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XLI. 
54. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 44. Similar clauses were inserted in the constitutions of Georgia, North 
Carolina, and Vermont. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LIV (“Schools shall be erected in each county, 
and supported at the general expense of the State, as the legislature shall hereafter point out.”); N.C. 
CONST. of 1776, § XLI (“That a school or schools shall be established by the Legislature, for the 
convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to the masters, paid by the public, as may enable 
them to instruct at low prices; and all useful learning shall be duly encouraged, and promoted, in one 
or more universities.”); VT. CONST. of 1777, § XL (“A school or schools shall be established in each 
town, by the legislature, for the convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to the masters, paid 
by each town; making proper use of school lands in each town, thereby to enable them to instruct 
youth at low prices. One grammar school in each county, and one university in this State, ought to be 
established by direction of the General Assembly.”). 
55. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
1783-1876, at 107-10 (1980) (describing Thomas Jefferson‟s support for education as a tool to 
exercise other personal rights); KAESTLE, supra note 52, at 4-9 (discussing the Founders‟ support for a 
right to education); NOAH WEBSTER, ON THE EDUCATION OF YOUTH IN AMERICA 3-22 (1790) 
(contending education is necessary for democratic order and advocating that states guarantee a right to 
education). 
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United States‟ new territory into townships, reserved a lot in every 
township “for the maintenance of public schools, within the said 
township.”56 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which set forth the 
parameters for how new territories could apply for statehood, provided: 
“Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government 
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall 
forever be encouraged.”57 Encouraging schools was implicitly a condition 
of statehood. 
Still, it would be going too far to say the Framers intended a right to 
education. Education was a local affair, with “district schools” for those 
who could pay and “free schools” for those who could not.58 But it also 
was a ramshackle affair at best in many places. Education was basic and 
religiously oriented.59 The pleas of those like Jefferson and Rush were 
often ignored.60 The reality was that education cost money and people 
were reluctant to be taxed for a luxury good—especially one that often 
went to other people‟s children.61 
C. Post-Ratification State Practice I: The Common Schools Movement 
Within one hundred years, however, the situation had changed to the 
point that it was difficult to deny the existence of a right to education. The 
impetus for this was the “common schools” movement that took hold 
beginning in about 1830. That movement had two dramatic effects. First, 
it left the nation with systems of statewide, centrally-administered public 
schools. Second, virtually every state adopted a constitutional provision 
affirming the right to education. 
In determining rights under the Due Process Clause, courts regularly 
look closely at the state and federal government practices that constitute us 
as a nation. Here is the explanation why, from one of our most 
conservative Justices: 
In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we 
have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a 
 
56. An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in the Western Territory 
(May 20, 1785), 28 JOURNALS CONTINENTAL CONG. 375, 378 (1933). 
57. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at LVII (2006). 
58. See KAESTLE, supra note 52, at 13; REISNER, supra note 52, at 279-80. 
59. See KAESTLE, supra note 52, at 14-17; REISNER, supra note 52, at 278-80; William A. 
Fischel, Neither “Creatures of the State” nor “Accidents of Geography”: The Creation of American 
Public School Districts in the Twentieth Century, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 177-78 (2010). 
60. Jefferson repeatedly sought without success to introduce a bill in the Virginia legislature for 
the establishment of public primary schools and a publicly controlled college without success (first in 
1779, then later in 1817). KAESTLE, supra note 52, at 8-9 (1983). The reasons for the bill‟s repeated 
failure are all too familiar: “[G]enerally, men of wealth, had little interest in being taxed for the 
education of the poor.” CREMIN, supra note 55, at 108; see also id. at 107-10 (providing a description 
of the bills, and Jefferson‟s belief in education‟s capacity to enable commerce, morality, civic duty, 
social relationships, and the exercise of basic personal rights). 
61. Id. 
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“liberty” be “fundamental”, but also that it be an interest 
traditionally protected by our society. As we have put it, the Due 
Process Clause affords only those protections “so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.”62 
As the state practices explored in this Section and the next show, the 
“traditions and conscience” of the nation strongly support a federal right to 
a minimally adequate education. 
By 1830 a number of forces had coalesced to create widespread demand 
for public education. Increased trade, capitalism, and urbanization drove 
the desire for enhanced education, even in rural areas, and even for young 
girls.63 Part of the motivation was nativist. Waves of immigrants from 
Europe with new languages and religions (particularly Catholicism) led to 
concerns about preserving “American” values.64 But the desire also was 
egalitarian and progressive. Activists such as Calvin Stowe, Horace Mann, 
and John Pierce “rode circuit,” speechifying for public schools.65 The 
journal Common School Advocate declared: “It is the child‟s right to be 
educated; and it is not only his right but it our indispensable duty to 
provide for the education of every child in the state.”66 
The common schools movement accomplished its objectives to a 
stunning degree. Its advocates sought to centralize the administration of 
schools, thus moving from a system of local funding and management to 
one overseen by the state government. They sought for the state to levy 
and disburse general taxes to help local districts finance public schools. 
They also believed that the centralization of school administration would 
provide for better management of schools and more competent teaching. 
By 1880 almost every state had a central administrator like a 
superintendent and a tax scheme in place for funding.67 
 
62. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (Scalia, J.). 
63. KAESTLE, supra note 52, at 23-25, 26-29, 65, 69. 
64. See FREDERICK B. BINDER, THE AGE OF THE COMMON SCHOOL: 1830-1865, at 10-11 (1974) 
(discussing fears of moral decay associated with immigration); Rosemary Salomone, Common 
Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL‟Y REV. 169, 174 
(1996) (“The communal isolation of newly arrived immigrants, their low economic status, and their 
high rates of illiteracy posed a threat to the vitality of the republic. The school would teach the 
newcomers the proper attitudes and values of American democracy and foster an understanding and 
appreciation for American social institutions.”). 
65. DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE 47-48 (1986) (discussing 
public advocacy and speech giving in the service of promoting public schools); see also id. at 55-56 
(discussing the driving personalities behind the movement); BINDER, supra note 64, at 91; KAESTLE, 
supra note 52, at 103-105. 
66.  EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA‟S POSITIVE RIGHTS 96 (forthcoming 2013). 
67. See Molly O‟Brien & Amanda Woodrum, Symposium: The Ohio Constitution—Then and 
Now: An Examination of the Law and History of the Ohio Constitution on the Occasion of Its 
Bicentennial, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 581, 625-26 (2004); Paul L. Tractenberg, Education, in 3 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 241, 245 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 
2006). 
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Most remarkable was the wave of state constitutional amendments 
guaranteeing education to residents. In 1834, eleven out of twenty-four 
state constitutions had language about education.68 By 1868, thirty-six out 
of thirty-seven did—and the language often obligated providing public 
education to all students.69 The Mississippi Constitution of 1868 was 
typical, providing: “[I]t shall be the duty of the legislature to encourage, 
by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and 
agricultural improvement, by establishing a uniform system of free public 
schools, by taxation or otherwise, for all children between the ages of five 
and twenty-one years, and shall, as soon as practicable, establish schools 
of higher grade.”70 In an exhaustive survey of state constitutions at the 
time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, Steven Calabresi and 
Sarah Agudo calculated that “[n]inety-two percent of all Americans in 
1868 lived in states whose constitutions imposed this duty on state 
government,”71 leading them to conclude that the right to education was 
not only “deeply rooted in American history and tradition,” but that it 
arguably became federally canonized with the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.72 
D. Precedent 
By 1918, education was compulsory in every state,73 but despite this 
fact and the promise of the late nineteenth century constitutions, reality for 
many students often fell shy of these ideals. Were this otherwise, Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt would not have had to include the “right to a good 
education” in his Second Bill of Rights.74 The years after 1880 were given 
over to significant administrative developments in state departments of 
education—standardizing curricula, licensing teachers, and appointing 
commissions to improve schools.75 But there was one glaring problem: 
funding. States typically relied on property taxes to fund local school 
 
68. Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive 
Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1467-68 (2010). 
69. Id. 
70. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
71. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions when the 
Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History 
and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 108-109 (2008). 
72. Id. at 108, 109-11. 
73. Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in 
Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 823 (1985). 
74. See 13 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 40-42 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed. 1950). 
75. See Tractenberg, supra note 67, at 242; DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 1785-1954, at 111-13 (1987); see also SCOTT ALAN METZGER, 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TEACHER QUALIFICATION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PAST SIX DECADES 4 
(2005), https://www.msu.edu/~mkennedy/TQQT/Reports/Metzger05TQHistory.pdf; TYACK & 
HANSOT, supra note 65, at 107 (“[T]he twentieth-century managers sought to „take school out of 
politics‟ and to shift decision making upward and inward in hierarchical systems of management.”). 
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districts with the result that richer neighborhoods had better schools, and 
poorer ones often had seriously substandard education.76 
The Supreme Court‟s seemingly unequivocal precedents with regard to 
a right to education were the result of litigations filed to fix the problem of 
disparate school funding. The seminal case was San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriguez, a challenge to Texas‟s method of funding public 
schools.77 Justice Powell‟s opinion for the Court brushed away the claim, 
relying in part on the fact that plaintiffs were seeking to enforce a positive 
constitutional right, not a negative one. “Education,” he wrote, “of course, 
is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution.”78 Of course. 
And in subsequent cases, the Justices have continued to decline to find a 
federal right to education. In Plyler v. Doe, another challenge from Texas 
in which the state denied unlawful aliens access to public schools, the 
Court determined that there had been a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, but it stressed that “[p]ublic education is not a „right‟ granted to 
individuals by the Constitution,” citing Rodriguez.79 In Kadramas v. 
Dickinson Public Schools, the Court rejected a challenge to a state law 
requiring parents to pay part of the cost of transporting their children to 
school.80 The Court stated, “the statute challenged in this case 
discriminates against no suspect class and interferes with no fundamental 
right.”81 
Still, despite these negative precedents, two significant facts remain. 
First, the constitutional education precedents were all Equal Protection 
cases, and—as we shall see—the right to a minimally adequate federal 
education is best located in the Due Process Clause. Second, try as they 
might, the justices could not quite close the door on the federal right they 
seemed to deny. 
The latter point first: the Supreme Court‟s cases constantly praised the 
importance of education and hedged on what it is the Court was actually 
resolving. In Rodriguez, the Court stressed that the state had “assure[d]” 
the trial court that it provided “„every child in every school district an 
adequate education,‟” and “[n]o proof was offered at trial persuasively 
discrediting or refuting the State‟s assertion.”82 Then, Justice Powell—
Rodriguez‟s author—affirmed a district court injunction barring Texas 
officials from closing schools to undocumented children.83 The district 
 
76. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 8-17 (1973). 
77. Id. at 100. 
78. Id. at 35. 
79. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35). 
80. 487 U.S. 450 (1988). 
81. Id. at 465. 
82. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24. 
83. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327 (1980). 
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court believed it to be an open question whether there was “a 
constitutional right to a minimal level of a free public education,” and 
Justice Powell found the lower court‟s decision was well-enough 
“reasoned.”84 Plyler found the Texas law invalid under a very non-
deferential “rational basis” review, stating: “By denying these children a 
basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of 
our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will 
contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.”85 And, 
in Papasan v. Allain, the Supreme Court described as open the question of 
whether there is a federal right to minimally adequate education.86 
Education, however, is hardly new to the Due Process Clause. Two of 
the seminal substantive Due Process cases, Meyer v. Nebraska87 and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,88 struck down state laws regulating the sort of 
education parents could provide their children. This was reaffirmed in 
Troxel v. Granville, in which the Court said: “[w]e have long recognized 
that a parent‟s interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, 
and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”89 While these cases highlight how Due 
Process protects parents‟ right to educate their children as they see fit, they 
also make clear that education is important enough to fall within the 
methodology of due process.  
Then there is one of the seminal statements regarding education in all of 
American law. In an Equal Protection case, true, but still the promise is 
clear. 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and 
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic 
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
 
84. Id. at 1332 (“[T]he court relied on a reservation in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, supra, to find room for its holding that there is a constitutional right to a minimal level of 
free public education. Thus, while not finding direct support in our precedents, the court concluded 
that these holdings are consistent with established constitutional principles.”). 
85. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). 
86. 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (“As Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet 
definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right, and 
whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal 
protection review.”). 
87. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state law forbidding the teaching of foreign languages 
prior to eighth grade). 
88. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a state law forbidding private education). 
89. 530 U.S. 57, 77 (2000). 
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environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.90 
That was Brown v. Board of Education, of course. And though Brown 
focused on citizenship and opportunity, its sentiment regarding the central 
importance of education to ensuring that one “succeed in life” is even truer 
in the age of global super-competitiveness. In the years since Brown was 
handed down, the forces underscoring a federal right to a minimally 
adequate education have only accelerated. 
E. Post-Ratification State Practice II: Minimally Adequate Education 
The Supreme Court‟s decision in Rodriguez triggered another wave of 
activity in the states, this one beginning in the courts but ultimately 
becoming a synergistic (sometimes antagonistic, sometimes cooperative) 
endeavor among the branches of state government. The funding inequality 
suits that led to Rodriguez are often called the “first wave” of educational 
reform.91 Following Rodriguez, there was a “second wave” seeking to use 
state law to equalize funding.92 But what really made a difference was the 
“third wave” of state constitutional litigation. This third wave sought not 
to equalize funding, but to assure every child an adequate education.93 
The state adequacy litigation has left a legacy of consequential state 
constitutional law. Every state constitution has a provision addressing 
education,94 and some thirty-one state courts—mostly high courts—have 
held those provisions to ensure minimally adequate education.95 Typical is 
 
90. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added). 
91. William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The 
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 600 (1994). 
92. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 127-143 (1995) 
(discussing the rise of equal-funding litigation under state law in the wake of Rodriguez); Jeffrey S. 
Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1963, 1980 (2008). 
93. For an overview of this shift, see William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in 
School Finance, 8 EDUC. POL‟Y 376, 376 (1994) (discussing the development of litigation strategy 
toward adequacy suits, the hallmark of “third wave” litigation). See also Enrich, supra note 92, at 166-
83 (arguing that adequacy litigation has significant advantages for plaintiffs over funding equality 
litigation). 
94. Tractenberg, supra note 67, at 241. Gershom Ratner published an article in 1985 that listed 
the state constitutional provision on education for 48 of the 50 states. Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal 
Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814 & n.138 
(1985) (listing education provisions for all state constitutions except Alabama and Mississippi). The 
states not included in Ratner‟s list also have education provisions within their respective constitutions. 
ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 201. 
95. Our research shows that in twenty-nine states, this decision has come down at the level of the 
highest court. See Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618, 643-48 (S.D. 2011); CCJEF v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240 
(2010); Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358 (Colo. 2009); Hancock v. Comm‟r of Educ., 443 Mass. 428 
(2005); Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005); Montoy v. 
State, 275 Kan. 145 (2003); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31 (2002); Vincent v. 
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this language from the Washington Supreme Court: 
[T]he State‟s constitutional duty goes beyond mere reading, 
writing and arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational 
opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our 
children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in 
today‟s market as well as in the market place of ideas. . . . The 
constitutional right to have the State “make ample provision for the 
education of all (resident) children” would be hollow indeed if the 
possessor of the right could not compete adequately in our open 
political system, in the labor market, or in the market place of 
ideas. In short . . . we hold that the[se constitutional concepts] 
constitute broad guidelines and that the effective teaching and 
opportunities for learning these essential skills make up the 
Minimum of the education that is constitutionally required.96 
More important, these holdings have led to tangible change on the 
ground. Although school reform had been an issue in Massachusetts for 
years, it was the initiation of state litigation that made change a reality,97 
galvanizing the legislature to pass the Education Reform Act and 
guarantee a “foundation budget” for every district in the state‟s funding 
formula.98 A watershed decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in 1989 
led to that state‟s Education Reform Act,99 increasing funding for pupils in 
low income districts and mandating new assessment tools.100 A North 
Carolina ruling led that state to create its “More at Four” preschool 
program.101 Similar stories can be told about many of the states, in which 
 
Voight, 236 Wis.2d 588 (2000); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58 (1999); Columbia 
Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 326 Mont. 304 (2005); Abbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145 (1997); 
Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336 (1997); DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St. 3d 193 (1997); Brigham v. 
State, 166 Vt. 246, 258-65 (1997); Hull v. Albrecht, 190 Ariz. 520 (1997); Campbell Sch. Dist. v. 
State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307 (1995); 
Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W. 2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994); Scott v. Comm., 247 Va. 
379, 386 (1994); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313-16 (Minn. 1993); Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. 
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573 (1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183 (1993); 
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632 
(1981); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672 (1979); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1979); 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476 (1978). We include Oregon in this group, although 
the Oregon Supreme Court has consistently refused to find the state in breach of its constitutional duty. 
See Pendleton Sch. Dist., 345 Or. 596 (2009). Also included is Nevada, although the affirmation of 
education as a “basic, substantive right” under the Constitution arose in a state budget-balancing suit. 
Guinn v. Angle, 71 P.3d 1269, 1275 (Nev. 2003). In two states, the highest court to find that the state 
constitution guarantees a right to an adequate education was at the trial level. Kasayulie v. State, No. 
3AN-97-3782 CIV (Alaska Super. Ct. 1999); Zuni Sch. Dist. v. State, CV-98-14-II (N.M. Dist. Ct. 14, 
1999). 
96. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 517-18. 
97. McDuffy v. State of Exec. Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 549 (1993). 
98. An Act Establishing the Education Reform Act, 1993 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 71 (West), 
available at http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1993/1993acts0071.pdf. 
99. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
100. Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208. 
101. The judge in the North Carolina case, Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr., found North Carolina‟s 
public education system failed to meet the state constitution‟s mandate to provide children an equal 
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court decisions spurred significant changes in the funding and nature of 
education, especially for underprivileged children. 
Although state reform efforts hardly moved in a single positive 
direction, at a minimum they served to establish a floor below which state 
funding and implementation could not fall. State litigation sometimes 
provoked a backlash from elected officials, as in Ohio where a court ruling 
led to efforts to discipline the courts and stalled education reform.102 
(Ironically, after the Ohio Supreme Court removed itself from the fray, the 
legislature implemented sweeping reforms, as the court had ordered.103) 
But in states like California and New Jersey, where budgetary pressures 
precipitated a slashing of funding for education, court decisions halted 
those cuts and ensured that state funding remained adequate.104 
F. The Federal Story 
In resolving Due Process claims, the Supreme Court often looks not 
only to state practices but to federal ones as well. The federal 
government‟s involvement in education is a complicated story, driven in 
part by the longstanding belief that education is a state—and perhaps more 
properly a local—affair. Localist impulses themselves are mixed, running 
from an understandable interest in making decisions about one‟s children 
close to home,105 to deeply racist and nativist fears.106 In reality, however, 
 
opportunity to receive a sound basic education in Hoke County v. State of North Carolina, an opinion 
issued in four parts beginning in 2000. The opinions are available at http://www.schoolfunding.info 
/states/nc/lit_nc_Hoke.php3. For a description of the More at Four program, see ELLEN S. PEISNER-
FEINBERG & JENNIFER M. SCHAAF, FPG Child Dev. Inst., EVALUATION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA 
MORE AT FOUR PRE-KINDERGARTEN PROGRAM: PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS IN THE SEVENTH 
YEAR (2007-2008) (2008), available at http://www.fpg.unc.edu/~mafeval/pages/publications.cfm 
(discussing the program‟s success in aiding 29,978 low-income and at-risk students in the 2007-08 
academic year). 
102. See Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, Standing Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of Powers, 
State Courts, and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 777-78 (2007) (summarizing the thirteen-
year morass of legislative and judicial gridlock in response to Ohio adequacy litigation); Larry J. 
Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio‟s Long Road to an Adequate Education, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 
83, 112 (2005) (describing the backlash to the Ohio Supreme Court rulings). The Ohio Supreme Court 
ended its jurisdiction in State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003). 
103. Under the leadership of Governor Ted Strickland, Ohio enacted a series of education reforms 
in the summer of 2009. For example, the state instituted a new evidence-based model for determining 
the level of education funding awarded to each school district. See Office of Ted Strickland, Press 
Release: Ohio Named Recipient of Education Commission of the States‟ Frank Newman Award (Jan. 
26, 2010), available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/83/81/8381.pdf. 
104. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Reed v. State, No. BC432420, ¶¶ 2, 3 
(Superior Ct. Calif. Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation 
/LAUSDLayoffs.pdf (enjoining California from conducting additional educational layoffs); Abbott v. 
Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1023-24 (N.J. 2011) (requiring the state to reinstate $1.6 billion in education 
funding cuts); Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d 602, 604 (N.J. 2002) (enjoining the state from cutting 
millions of dollars in “supplemental funding” to school districts). 
105. The Court in Rodriguez considered localized control of education a highly significant 
principle of American schooling. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) 
(“In an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of government, 
local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived. The merit of local control was 
recognized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in [Wright v. Council of the City of 
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the responsibility for assuring the quality of education in America‟s 
schools has shifted up the governmental ladder. The centralizing trends 
toward state government began with the Common Schools movement and 
continued for the next century; the centralizing trends toward the federal 
government are more recent.107 
Until the 1980s, the federal role in education was a limited one, and 
primarily encompassed providing aid to underfunded districts and 
underprivileged children. But even that took time to come about. Until 
World War II, the federal government‟s role in education was largely 
limited to collecting statistics on education or making targeted investments 
such as in agricultural colleges.108 In 1917, Congress authorized federal 
grants to primary and secondary schools for agricultural, home economics, 
and industrial programs.109 After World War II, however, America‟s 
expanding middle-class came to demand more in the way of higher 
education, increasing the federal role.110 The result was the Elementary 
and Secondary School Act (ESEA), which provided federal grants to 
every poor school district in America.111 
 
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)]. Mr. Justice Stewart stated there that „(d)irect control over decisions 
vitally affecting the education of one‟s children is a need that is strongly felt in our society.‟”). 
106. See BINDER, supra note 64, and accompanying text (discussing nativist impulses in early 
American education); Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 
504 (2010) (discussing use of school district zoning as an instrument of de facto segregation despite 
such segregation being de jure illegal). 
107. For a discussion of centralizing trends during the Common Schools movement and in the 
decades after, see supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text. For an explanation of how, today, teacher 
certification standards, K-12 curriculum content, and achievement standards are set by state 
governmental bodies, see Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal 
Protection: the First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1343, 1405 (“[T]he states, rather than the local school districts, set teacher qualification and 
certification standards, as well as control teacher preparation programs.”); and, for example, Va. Code 
Ann. § 22.1(B) (2006) (“The Board of Education shall establish educational objectives known as the 
Standards of Learning, which shall form the core of Virginia‟s educational program . . . . At a 
minimum, the Board shall establish Standards of Learning for English, mathematics, science, and 
history and social science.”). 
108. Patrick J .McGuinn, The Early Federal Role in Education—ESEA and the Equity Regime, in 
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY: 1965-2005, at 
25, 26 (Patrick McGuinn ed., 2006) (discussing narrow statistics-gathering mandate of U.S. Office for 
Education in the wake of its establishment by Congress in 1867); Morrill Land Grant Act of July 2, 
1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (creating network of agricultural colleges using funds derived from federal 
lands). 
109. Smith-Hughes Act, Pub. L. No. 347, §§ 1-4, 39 Stat. 929 (1917). 
110. Various sources describe the expansion of the middle class in the post-War decade (due, in 
great part, to the G.I. Bill). See ROBERT A. BEAUREGARD, WHEN AMERICA BECAME SUBURBAN 
(2006) (describing growth in homeownership rates and middle class employment opportunities after 
World War II); EDWARD HUMES, OVER HERE: HOW THE G.I. BILL TRANSFORMED THE AMERICAN 
DREAM (2006) (providing analysis of the effect of the G.I. Bill on the expansion of the middle class); 
and Milton Greenberg, How the GI Bill Changed Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 18, 
2004, at B9-B10 (discussing how the G.I. Bill contributed to increased college enrollment). 
111. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified 
as amended at 20 U.S.C. ch. 70 (2006)). Wariness about the expansion of the federal government‟s 
role in education was alive and well in both the Executive and Legislative branches even as they 
sought to pass ESEA. Even during the passage of this Act, both the President‟s Commissioner of 
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Then, in the 1980s, the nation displayed a series of seemingly 
contradictory impulses about the federal role in education, first endorsing 
limits on it and then wholeheartedly supporting significant federal 
intervention. Ronald Reagan ran for President on a platform of reducing 
federal involvement in the nation‟s schools, and achieved success in 
cutting federal education funding and in slicing back the Department of 
Education.112 In 1983, however, the National Commission on Excellence 
in Education published its stunning report, A Nation at Risk, concluding: 
“[T]he educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded 
by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and 
a people.”113 Citing concerns from the quality of curricula, to the 
“expectations” for high-school graduates, to “the use that American 
schools and students make of time,” A Nation at Risk warned that America 
was falling behind its foreign counterparts.114 By the time Reagan left 
office, the public‟s views had shifted entirely. A poll in the late 1980s 
showed 71% of Americans supporting a change in course from Reagan‟s 
policies on schools.115 Reagan‟s successor George H.W. Bush called 
himself the “education president” and used his office as a bully pulpit to 
spark state and local efforts.116 
Beginning in the late 1980s, a clear federal role was demarcated to 
ensure adequate education. In 1989, governors called together by 
President Bush declared: “[T]he time has come, for the first time in U.S 
history, to establish clear, national performance goals, goals that will 
make us internationally competitive.”117 Then, in 1991, President Bush 
rolled out an America 2000 education bill proposing federal standards in 
core curricular subjects.118 Although the bill failed, it set the stage for what 
was to follow. In 1994, President William Jefferson Clinton signed two 
significant education bills. First, Goals 2000: Educate America Act, set 
 
Education and lead sponsors of the bill in Congress were careful to reiterate that the goal was for “the 
Federal Government [to] participate—not seek domination, but to serve as a partner” in improving 
education. See 111 Cong. Rec. 880 (1965) (statement of Francis Keppel, Comm‟r of Ed.); see also 111 
Cong. Rec. 5734 (1965) (statement of Rep. Adam Clayton Powell). 
112. Reagan had cut back the Department of Education by eleven percent and the National 
Institute of Education by seventy percent by 1988. Patrick J. McGuinn, The Early Federal Role in 
Education—ESEA and the Equity Regime, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY: 1965-2005, at 46 (Patrick McGuinn ed., 2006). 
113. NAT‟L COMM‟N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 1 (1983), available at http://reagan.procon.org/sourcefiles/a-nation-at-risk 
-reagan-april-1983.pdf. 
114. Id. at 2-3. 
115. McGuinn, supra note 112, 49. 
116. MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, FROM A NATION AT RISK TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND: NATIONAL 
EDUCATION GOALS AND THE CREATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY 35 (2009).  
117. Bernard Weintraub, Bush and Governors Set Education Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1989 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/29/us/bush-and-governors-set 
-education-goals.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
118. U.S. DEP‟T OF EDUC., AMERICA 2000: AN EDUCATION STRATEGY 19-36 (1993). 
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voluntary national content and performance standards and devoted over 
$400 million to achieving those goals.119 As a House Report noted: “Never 
in our 200-year history as a Nation have we had national standards for 
what students should know. Such standards can serve as a focal point for 
education reform efforts and set voluntary goals toward which all students 
can strive.”120 Second, the Improving America‟s School Act (IASA) 
conditioned what was then ten billion dollars of federal Title I money 
(created under the ESEA statute) on states developing “challenging” 
content and performance standards and mechanisms to assess and ensure 
progress.121 Title I, a program designed in the 1960s to alleviate poverty, 
had become a hook for ensuring adequate education for all children. 
In this century, the federal role has expanded with dramatic new 
legislation and increased funding, which serves only to underscore both 
the nation‟s commitment to adequate education in elementary and 
secondary schools, and to a strong federal role within that project. The No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001, a legislative priority of President George 
W. Bush, turned the federal government into the “umpire” of school 
quality.122 Like IASA, it set performance standards and required 
implementation, but now federal law required annual assessments of all 
students in the state rather than just Title I students;123 it required that 
schools develop specific plans to ensure “all students . . . meet or exceed” 
state proficiency levels; and it mandated that qualified teachers be in every 
classroom.124 And in adopting NCLB, members of Congress made 
stunning statements about the role of the federal government and the right 
to education: 
“This proposal before the Senate represents an important step in the 
right direction by recognizing the right of every child to receive a 
high quality education.”125 
“Every child in America has a right to a world-class education. This 
bill enacts the reforms and provides the resources necessary to make 
this right a reality.”126 
“[T]he right to a high quality public education goes to the very core 
 
119. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, § 102, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) . 
120. H.R. REP. NO. 103-168, at 38 (1993). 
121. Improving America‟s Schools Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382 § 1111(a), 1111(b)(1)(A), 
1111(b)(2)-(3) & 1111(c)(1), 108 Stat. 3518 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.). 
122. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
123. Title I students refer to those who benefit from the Title I program—either because they live 
in Local Education Areas that receive Title I grants, or because they live in schools that do. 
124. Id. at §§ 1111(b)(2)(F), (G)(iii)-(iv) & 1119. 
125. 147 CONG. REC. 26577 (2001) (statement of Sen. Blanche Lincoln). 
126. 147 CONG. REC. 26577 (2001) (statement of Sen. Jim Bunning). 
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of the American values of fairness, opportunity, hard work, and 
democracy. Ensuring that all American children can get an adequate 
education, despite their family income, race, or accident of 
geography, will pull families out of poverty and make our country 
stronger.”127 
These developments have accelerated in important ways under President 
Barack Obama‟s administration. The signature piece of legislation has 
been Race to the Top, a federal program devoting billions of dollars in 
federal reward money to states that buy into federal benchmarks and adopt 
workable means of achieving them.128 One requirement is a willingness to 
sign onto “common core standards.”129 Race to the Top funds have 
spurred alternative and innovative school programs across the country.130 
Roughly forty-five states have signed on to the Common Core Standards, 
a set of standards defining the knowledge and skills that students should 
have from kindergarten to twelfth grade, developed by a collaboration of 
governors, state commissioners of education, teachers, and experts.131 
And, finally, the federal government is paying an increasing share of the 
national education budget. While the federal government‟s increase vis-à- 
vis local governments is nowhere near as dramatic as the shift to state 
funding,132 it is still quite significant. In 1965 the federal share of 
education funding was under 5%;133 now it is over 10%.134 And this 10% 
is only direct expenditures. The deductibility of state and local taxes on 
federal returns provides indirect support,135 and some experts estimate this 
form of indirect support is roughly equal to the federal government‟s 
direct contributions.136 Additionally, private schools are charitable 
 
127. 147 CONG. REC. 26148 (2001) (statement of Rep. Dennis Moore). 
128. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 14006, 123 
Stat. 115, 284; Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688 (Nov. 18, 2009). 
129. For Race to the Top Fund, see supra note 128, at 59,688-89, 59,691. 
130. Benjamin Michael Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act and the Shifting Federal Role in Education, 76 MO. L. REV. 81, 108-109 (2011). 
131. In the States, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org 
/in-the-states (last visited June 26, 2012). 
132. States today outspend local governments on education. In 2008-09, 47% of the average 
pupil‟s education spending was born by the state government, and 44% by the local government. See 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES: 2009, at 5 tbl. 5 (2011), available at http:// 
www2.census.gov/govs/school/09f33pub.pdf. The federal share in 2008-2009 was 9.5%. Id. 
133. See NAT‟L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, tbl. 180 (2011), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_180.asp. 
134. See U.S. DEP‟T OF EDUC., THE FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION, http://www2.ed.gov/about 
/overview/fed/role.html (last visited April 30, 2012) (showing that federal spending accounted for 
10.8% of all education spending in the 2011-2012 academic year). 
135. See NAT‟L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, tbl. 384 (2011), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_384.asp (showing that estimated 
federal tax expenditures for education in 2001 were roughly equal to the federal direct expenditures for 
primary and secondary education in that year). 
136. Susanna Loeb & Miguel Socias, Federal Contributions to High-Income School Districts: 
The Use of Tax Deductions for Funding K-12 Education, 23 ECON. EDUC. REV. 85, 86 (2004). 
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institutions, so they do not pay direct taxes and contributions to them are 
deductible as well. All told, the federal government plainly provides well 
over 10% of the cost of educating a child in public school, and then 
subsidizes thousands of students who opt out of the public system 
altogether. 
These significant shifts—the centralizing of responsibility for education, 
a greater federal role even in curricular definition—would not have come 
about without public support. In 1986, just as attitudes toward federal 
involvement in education were changing, 24% of all parents and 28% of 
public school parents chose the federal government as the “best way” to 
finance public education.137 Twelve years later, after Goals 2000 and 
IASA, those numbers stood at 37% and 41%.138 A poll following NCLB 
and Race to the Top legislation showed that 56% of parents of children in 
grades kindergarten through twelve believed the federal government 
should be more involved in education.139 
Many negative rights with far less basis in the traditions of the 
American people than education have been recognized by the Supreme 
Court. Today, all states protect the right to education under state 
constitutions, and a supermajority of them has recognized the right to 
ensure some minimally adequate education. Schooling is compulsory in all 
states and a majority of the funding comes from state governments, with a 
significant portion from the federal government. Over time there has been 
a shift—gradual but important—toward performance-based standards that 
are unified to some extent throughout the nation. Indeed, looking to what 
Americans say and do, it would be extremely difficult, but for the text of 
our very old Constitution, to argue that education is not a fundamental 
right. 
V. WHAT ELSE IS IN THE CONSTITUTION? 
Is the right to education unique in being an affirmative right now 
sufficiently well-established by practice, that as a matter of ordinary 
constitutional interpretation it appears to be part of the Constitution? We 
don‟t know. The work of ordinary interpretation is difficult, and we‟ve not 
done that extensive work for other rights. Here, however, we offer 
tentative thoughts on other constitutional rights that arguably exist or are 
evolving in that direction.140 
 
137. Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll, June 1998, http://www.pollingreport.com/ed2.htm. 
138. Id. 
139. Gallup Poll Social Series: Work and Education, Question 21, August 2010, http:// 
www.gallup.com/poll/142904/americans-support-federal-involvement-education.aspx. Poll results are 
based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,013 adults living in the continental United 
States. 
140. Other scholars have surely visited this topic. See Cass Sunstein, Why Does the American 
Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 20, 22-23 (2005) 
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First, consider the right to healthcare, or to a method of financing the 
consumption of healthcare, such as through health insurance. As with 
education, we begin with the lack of explicit constitutional text and with a 
glaring precedent purportedly rejecting the right—Harris v. McRae.141 In 
Harris, the Supreme Court held that states have no duty under the Due 
Process Clause to pay for abortions for women, even when necessary to 
save a woman‟s life. “[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in 
the path of a woman‟s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not 
remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls into the latter 
category.”142 But developments at the state and federal levels over the past 
half-century have arguably made Harris an inaccurate reflection of current 
constitutional understandings, especially if one looks beyond abortion to 
healthcare more broadly.143 
At least twelve state constitutions “address either the state‟s role with 
regard to public health in general or healthcare for the poor 
specifically.”144 Most of these public health provisions were added in the 
twentieth century, with six dating to the 1970s.145 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has recognized “preservation of health” as an implied 
constitutional right in recent years, even though there is no specific text 
referring to healthcare in the New Jersey constitution.146 There has not yet 
been the same amount of state court jurisprudence surrounding Public 
Health Clauses as there has been for Education Clauses,147 but that will 
likely change as states develop more and more comprehensive systems of 
 
(contending that “American constitutional law could have easily come to recognize social and 
economic rights” through dynamic constitutional interpretation, and that there was a “serious and 
partially successful effort[] in the 1960s and 1970s” to do so in various cases, but that Nixon‟s election 
in 1968 and the shifting composition of the Supreme Court ended that possibility); Steven J. Heyman, 
The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 Duke L.J. 507, 
510-12 (1991) (arguing “although the positive role of government has reached a zenith since the New 
Deal,” and now includes the provision of minimal income, housing, and other services, “[t]he classical 
state had a crucial positive function—the protection of rights,” and the Fourteenth Amendment 
codified that as a state duty); Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of 
Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 37, 37-39 (1990) (locating rights to minimal 
subsistence and housing in the Thirteenth Amendment); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A 
Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2346-47 (1990) (refuting the general reading of the U.S. 
Constitution as a charter of negative liberties). 
141. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
142. Id. at 316; accord Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 507 (1989); Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
143. Mark Earnest & Dayna Bowen Matthew, A Property Right to Medical Care, 29 J. LEGAL 
MED. 65, 67 (2008) (“[A]lthough American law has not directly created a right to health care, 
Americans‟ public investment in the medical industry has.”). 
144. Usman, supra note 68, at 1473. 
145. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1325, 1347 (2010). 
146. Leonard, supra note 145, at 1366. 
147. Id. at 1348 (“Judicial interpretation of the relevant [health-related constitutional] provisions 
is relatively thin.”). 
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oversight and management for healthcare.148 
Meanwhile, the federal government has become increasingly involved 
in the provision of healthcare since the 1950s, the capstone being the 
Affordable Care Act.149 In 1954, Congress amended the Internal Revenue 
Code to exclude from federal tax liability contributions of employers to 
group health insurance plans.150 The following decade, Congress created 
the Medicare and Medicaid programs, thereby subsidizing health 
insurance not only for the employed, but for the elderly and poor.151 
Federal spending for these initiatives has swelled to enormous 
proportions; in 2009, the employer tax exclusion cost the government 
$242 billion,152 while Medicare cost $500 billion (22% of total healthcare 
consumption in the United States).153 During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, 
Congress broadened access to healthcare by imposing regulations on 
employers, hospitals, and insurers. It passed a law in 1986 requiring that 
hospitals participating in Medicare provide emergency treatment without 
regard to ability to pay.154 It obligated insurance companies to ensure 
continuity and portability of coverage through sweeping reforms in 1974 
and 1996.155 
Perhaps one of the strongest indicators of the public‟s acceptance of an 
implicit right to healthcare in the United States is the undertone of the 
recent ACA litigation. In its Supreme Court briefs and oral argument, the 
federal government contended that an essential reason why Congress was 
justified in imposing an individual mandate was that, in this country, there 
is a deeply rooted “social norm” that one should not be turned away from 
a hospital or from necessary medical care.156 And because the sick are 
inevitably treated, costs are shifted to those who are insured. The 
 
148. Massachusetts and Utah are the only states with state-wide health insurance programs, and 
both programs are relatively new. In areas where the state has long provided healthcare—for example, 
for the poor, for the insane, for criminal convicts, and in hospitals—state litigation has been more 
developed, and courts have read the constitutional language to impose an affirmative duty on the state. 
Leonard, supra note 145, at 1392. 
149. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. 
150. U.S. Senate Comm. on Budget, Tax Expenditures, S. Rpt. No. 110-667, 110th Cong. 2d 
Sess., at 784 (2008). 
151. Health Insurance for the Aged and Medical Assistance, Pub. L. No. 89-79, 79 Stat. 286 
(1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
152. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, tbl. 16:1 (2010). 
153. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 2011 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 37 (2010). 
154. Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 .S.C. § 1395dd. 
155. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406; Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.1936; cf. Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (providing that 
employers who offer employer-sponsored group health benefit plans must provide coverage for a 
limited time after the occurrence of certain events). 
156. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Dep‟t of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012); see also Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 39, Dep‟t of Health & 
Hum. Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (referring to a “societal norm”). 
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government contended: 
For decades, state and federal laws—reflecting deeply rooted 
societal values—have required emergency rooms to stabilize 
patients who arrive with an emergency condition, and common-
law and ethical duties restrict a physician‟s ability to terminate a 
patient-physician relationship. The uninsured thus participate 
actively in the market for health case services, even if they cannot 
pay in full [. . . .] It was clearly proper for Congress to take into 
account these legal norms, and the societal judgments they reflect, 
in determining that denying health care to persons without 
insurance, or otherwise attempting to penalize them at a time of 
medical need, was an inappropriate means of addressing 
uncompensated care.157 
Notably, the challengers to ACA never refuted the existence of the 
underlying public norm on which the government hinged its argument. 
Their claim was instead that Congress lacks the authority to deal with the 
problem through imposing an individual mandate. 
Five Justices of the Supreme Court agreed with the challengers‟ claim 
that Congress lacks the authority to deal with the cost-shifting problems 
under the Commerce Clause, but they did not call into question the fact 
that all individuals in the United States will eventually participate in the 
healthcare market regardless of their ability to pay, given existing social 
norms. Throughout three days of oral argument, in fact, one Justice after 
another appeared to accept the premise that under federal statutes, state 
laws, common law, and public norms, the right to healthcare is an 
undeniable incident of United States residency.158 
A second possibility for a constitutional right we might find through 
what we call ordinary constitutional interpretation is a right to basic 
subsistence—or welfare support. Twenty-three state constitutions have 
express welfare clauses, either authorizing or directing the state and local 
governments to care for the state‟s indigent residents.159 In New York, the 
constitutional language is quite exacting: the legislature is affirmatively 
required to “aid, care, and support” the poor.160 Alabama, Kansas and 
 
157. Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 7, 40, Dep‟t of Health & Hum. Servs. 
v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); see also id. at 2 (“As a class, the uninsured shift tens of billions of 
dollars of costs for the uncompensated care they receive to other market participants annually. The 
cost-shifting drives up insurance premiums, which, in turn, makes insurance unaffordable to even 
more people. The Act breaks this cycle . . . .”); and id. at 39-40 (citing state court rulings and statutes 
that “have long imposed . . . a duty on doctors and hospitals to provide necessary emergency care”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
158. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 156, at 6, 9, 19-20, 23-24, 32-33. 
159. William C. Rava, State Constitutional Protections for the Poor, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 543, 553 
(1998). 
160. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (“The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and 
shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, 
as the legislature may from time to time determine.”). 
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Oklahoma impose an affirmative duty on state counties to provide for the 
indigent.161 In other states, the constitutional language is admittedly less 
precise. One scholar sums up the content of state Welfare Clauses as 
follows: “Exactly what the legislature must provide and for whom it must 
be provided is largely unspecified. Many of the provisions use a 
combination of mandatory and permissive language, making the scope of 
the command unclear.”162 State courts have generally taken a more 
deferential posture toward acts of legislatures in suits brought under state 
constitutions‟ Welfare Clauses as compared to suits brought under 
Education Clauses,163 but they have struck down limitations on welfare 
payments where the program could not be rationally defended. For 
instance, in Fulton v. Krauskopf, the New York Supreme Court held it was 
unreasonable for the City of New York to provide a flat grant of eighteen 
dollars to parents for travel allowances to take their children to school, 
because it forced families to “make the hard choice between eating and 
education.”164 
The federal government‟s involvement in the field of welfare, as in the 
fields of education and healthcare, has deepened over the course of the 
twentieth century. The first modern piece of welfare legislation was the 
Social Security Act of 1935, which created Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), a joint federal-state program.165 Through 
AFDC, Congress gave grants to states to support their public benefit 
programs for children with deceased fathers.166 The primary beneficiaries 
were white widows,167 until Congress reformed AFDC in 1962 to broaden 
coverage to women who were unmarried, separated, or divorced.168 
AFDC, which has since been replaced by the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families program, is only one example of the federal government‟s 
role in providing for the poor. Means-tested “safety-net” programs run by 
the federal government have come to include the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, which provides refundable tax credits to the working poor; 
 
161. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88 (“It shall be the duty of the legislature to require the several 
counties of this state to make adequate provision for the maintenance of the poor.”); KAN. CONST. art. 
VII, § 4 (“The respective counties of the state shall provide, as may be prescribed by law, for those 
inhabitants who, by reason of . . . other misfortune, may have claims upon the aid of society. . . . 
[Provided, however, t]he state may participate financially in such aid and supervise and control the 
administration thereof.”); OKLA. CONST. art. XVII, § 3 (“The several counties of the State shall 
provide, as may be prescribed by law, for those inhabitants who, by reason of . . . misfortune, may 
have claims upon the sympathy and aid of the county.”). 
162. Rava, supra note 159, at 561. 
163. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal 
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1152-53 (1999). 
164. 484 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
165. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620. 
166. Id. 
167. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 23-25 (1995). 
168. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(3), 76 Stat. 172, 185 
(1962). 
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Supplemental Security Income, which provides cash benefits to disabled 
adults and children of limited means; and Supplemental Nutritional 
Assistant Program (SNAP), the federal food stamp program.169 When food 
stamps were launched in 1964, they reached half a million people.170 
Today, SNAP serves one in seven Americans, a population roughly equal 
to Spain‟s, at an annual cost of $78 billion.171 
As in the cases of education or healthcare, the conventional wisdom is 
that the Supreme Court denied the existence of a constitutional right in 
Dandridge v. Williams, upholding a Maryland regulation setting a limit of 
$250 per month on the benefits available to families in AFDC.172 The 
Supreme Court determined that the regulation needed only to be rational 
because it dealt “with state regulation in the social and economic field, not 
affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment only because the regulation results in some 
disparity in grants of welfare payments to the largest AFDC families.”173 
But like Rodriguez, Dandridge was an Equal Protection Clause case—no 
arguments were made or adjudicated with respect to the Due Process 
Clause. To the extent that Dandridge has been read to carry due process 
ramifications, it may need to be revisited. Given the breadth of state 
constitutional protections regarding public benefits, and given the 
expansion of the federal government‟s role in the provision of welfare 
over the twentieth century, it might be the case that access to basic 
subsistence has become entrenched, in the mindset of the country, as an 
unassailable constitutional guarantee.174 
Finally, recent enactments suggest the possibility of a right to 
environmental health. This right is of more recent vintage—its roots date 
back only fifty years ago, to the 1960s and 1970s, when Congress passed 
landmark statutes dealing with environmental regulation, and states 
amended their constitutions to insert environmental bills of rights. At the 
 
169. URBAN INSTITUTE, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM—RESEARCH 
SYNTHESIS BRIEF SERIES 6 (2012). 
170. For the Act, see Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, §§ 5-7, 78 Stat. 703. For 
descriptions of numbers of initial beneficiaries, see U.S. Dep‟t of Ag. Food & Nutrition Serv., 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/rules/Legislation/about 
.htm. 
171. Jordan Weissman, Why Are Republicans Waging War on Food Stamps?, ATLANTIC (June 
21, 2012) http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/06/why-are-republicans-waging-war-on-
food-stamps-now/258794. 
172. 397 U.S. 471, 472 (1970). 
173. Id. at 484. 
174. For the view that “[b]asic welfare payments ought to be understood as constitutional 
entitlements” but that courts should only act on them “once other institutions of government have 
acted and created contexts in which the issue of rights surfaces,” see Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in 
Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 429-33 
(2010). For the view that a right to minimum economic independence—as provided through minimum 
subsistence and shelter—are part of our constitutional tradition and are formally guaranteed by Section 
Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, see Amar, supra note 140, at 37-39. 
30
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol25/iss1/6
SOLOW & FRIEDMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2013 10:05 AM 
2013] Solow & Friedman 99 
federal level, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act,175 
the Clean Water Act,176 the Clean Air Act,177 the Endangered Species 
Act,178 the Safe Water Drinking Act,179 and the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act,180 to name a few. These statutes established the 
Council on Environmental Quality;181 they obligated federal agencies to 
study the environmental impacts of their projects and publish these 
findings in public reports;182 and they directed federal authorities not only 
to study methods for combating pollution and make recommendations to 
states, but also to promulgate binding regulations for air and water quality 
which private actors across the country would now have to follow.183 
President Nixon deserves credit for driving the movement forward, as he 
announced a pollution control initiative in a State of the Union Address in 
1969 and created the Environmental Protection Agency by executive order 
a year later.184 
At the state level, fourteen states inserted environmental provisions in 
their constitutions between 1960 and 1978, “not merely to require the 
responsible management of particular state-owned lands or resources, but 
also to mandate that legislatures combat problems of pollution and 
environmental degradation throughout their states.”185 Six states made 
 
175. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 
(2006)) [hereinafter NEPA]. 
176. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2006)). Under the original Water Pollution 
Control Act, promulgated in 1948, Congress authorized the Surgeon General of the Public Health 
Service to undertake investigations, research, and surveys to encourage state and local bodies to 
impose water pollution controls. In 1972, Congress rewrote the statute to expand the federal 
government‟s powers, now giving the EPA authority to “prepare or develop comprehensive programs 
for preventing, reducing, or eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and underground 
waters.” Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 102(a). 
177. See Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006)). While the Clean Air Act 
dated back to 1963, it was at that point only an authorization of a research program. It was with the 
1970 extension that Congress empowered the EPA to impose the first set of substantive air quality 
requirements. 
178. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 
(2006)). 
179. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-
26 (2006)). 
180. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6986 (2006)). 
181. NEPA, § 201. 
182. Id. § 102(C). 
183. Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2006)). 
184. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15 623 (July 9, 1970). 
185. Zackin, supra note 66, at 198; see also Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Interpretation of State 
Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 181 & n.58 
(1993) (aggregating provisions in state constitutions dealing with environmental protection and natural 
resources, and explaining that many of these provisions were added in the 1970s after a federal 
constitutional amendment failed). 
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environmental health either a citizen‟s right or the state‟s duty. For 
instance, the Illinois constitution declares: “Each person has the right to a 
healthful environment.”186 Nine states included language stating the 
legislature would take action to protect the environment. The New Mexico 
provision reads: “The legislature shall provide for control of pollution and 
control of despoilment of the air, water and other natural resources of this 
state.”187 The environmental movement that helped galvanize the state 
constitutional conventions during this period was similar to the common 
schools movement in the mid-1800s: a self-conscious group of activists 
and reformers organized and lobbied locally but coordinated across states 
to share information and ideas, and articulated their mission as a matter of 
inalienable rights—every citizen of the state should have a basic human 
right in the use and enjoyment of its natural resources.188 State 
constitutions‟ environmental clauses have not yet produced the same sort 
of litigation successes as have education clauses,189 but it is early.190 
CONCLUSION 
We began with a hope: that the legal academy stop talking about talking 
about the Constitution. It is time to put aside a tendentious debate about 
interpretation that has been going nowhere and begin to explore the 
substantive meaning of constitutional provisions. In doing so, we advocate 
using the process of ordinary constitutional interpretation, which is to say 
looking at the full range of sources that courts actually examine in 
constitutional litigation. Not everyone will agree with our substantive 
interpretations regarding education, health care, and other rights, but this 
is the turf on which contest should occur. It is time to start talking about 
the Constitution again, even if—or especially if—we disagree about its 
meaning. 
 
 
186. Id. at 201 (quoting the Illinois Constitution). 
187. Id. at 201 (quoting the Nevada Constitution). 
188. Id. at 211-13, 216-17. 
189. Id. at 256; Cusack, supra note 185, at 182-96. 
190. Sylvia Ewald, State Court Adjudication of Environmental Rights: Lessons from the 
Adjudication of the Right to Education and the Right to Welfare, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 416-17, 
457-58 (2011) (contending that state courts should look to their methods of constitutional rights 
enforcement in public education and welfare cases to more successfully enforce environmental rights 
in state constitutions). 
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